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2Abstract
The role of multi-disciplinary Global Professional Service 
Firms (GPSFs) in the architecture of international tax 
abuse has been very little studied. Although it has been 
known that some of these firms operate in many of the 
world’s secrecy jurisdictions the scale of their activity in 
these, and other, locations has been little understood. 
Nor has their own representations of their tax services 
been appropriately considered. This working paper 
seeks to redress this deficiency. We locate the activities 
of these firms in the broader context of their activities 
around the globe, since it is the boast of many of them 
that they operate in more than 140 jurisdictions, world-
wide. The research has revealed the opacity of the data 
surrounding these firms, and the unusual nature of their 
ownership structures. Financial reports of these firms are 
not available for most jurisdictions in which they work, 
whilst common control through ownership structures 
rarely crosses national boundaries. Using global directo-
ries of the firms as indication of presence in a location 
and the number of employees by jurisdiction as an indi-
cation of scale, our research indicates the disproportion-
ate activity of particular GPSFs firms, namely the ‘Big 
Four’ accountancy firms, providing tax based services 
in secrecy jurisdictions. This suggests that they are ma-
jor suppliers of offshore financial services.  We consider 
the evolution of these GPSFs since the 1990s, suggesting 
they have been conscious participants in this activity but 
that their behaviour has adapted over time to reflect 
prevailing taxation morés to preserve the reputations of 
those supplying these services. As we show, these morés 
are reflected in their own presentation of their services 
as promoted on their web sites, which have changed 
significantly over time to reflect this fact, with little evi-
dence that there has been any real underlying change in 
behaviour. As a result we suggest that these firms display 
a form of adaptive behaviour worthy of further study.
Introduction
A classic question for scholars of institutional change is 
how particular organizational forms spread across the 
globe (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In this paper we address 
this classic question by assessing how particular Global 
Professional Service Firms (hereafter GPSFs) are located 
across the world and the likely tax services they provide. 
Our particular concern is with the ‘Big Four’ accountancy 
and audit firms – KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, De-
loitte & Touche and Ernst & Young – and the location and 
replication of their services provide. These GPSFs have a 
global presence and are important in advising both the 
private and public sector. They are a key source of expert 
authority on tax optimization and corporate structuring 
in the international political economy. Their staff num-
bers grossly outweigh those of the largest intergovern-
mental organizations by ten to sixty-fold. These firms 
have been a source of inspiration for what are now clas-
sic theories of organizational replication through ‘iso-
morphism’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Greenwood et al. 
2010). They have also been a site for studying legitima-
cy claims between private firms and regulators (Green-
wood and Suddaby 2006), for investigations into how 
GPSFs place pressures on re-scaling and re-scoping pro-
fessional practices in various countries (Muzio and Faul-
conbridge 2013; Faulconbridge and Muzio 2016), as well 
as sites of investigation for how professionalization and 
socialization occur within large corporate organizations 
(Grey 1998; Annisette 2000). The Big Four have been sites 
of particular interest for tracing the evolution of profes-
sional habitus within GPSFs (Malsch and Gendron 2013; 
Carter and Spence 2014; Lupu and Empson 2015; Spence 
et al. 2016). 
A recent strand of scholarship has questioned the role of 
GPSFs in the replication of practices and structures in the 
international political economy that exacerbate inequal-
ities and power asymmetries. GPSFs have been identified 
as forming strategic alliances, using tactics to leverage 
their expertise and lobbying power, and how, in their pro-
fessional practices, they infiltrate client organizations, 
align worldviews on what is appropriate conduct and ac-
tively dismiss alternatives. Their power is considered to 
be episodic in their use of coercion and manipulation, as 
well as systemic in promoting forms of domination and 
subjectification via professionalization and rhetorical le-
gitimation (Boussebaa and Faulconbridge 2018). As such, 
GPSFs provide a form of ‘neo-imperialism’ in the ‘periph-
ery’ while also being heavily engaged in accountancy and 
consultancy services within all advanced industrial coun-
tries (Boussebaa 2017).
The activities of the Big Four have been linked to services 
that enable tax avoidance (Sikka and Hampton 2005). 
Certainly executives and tax directors in multinational 
firms have considered the Big Four as excellent in pro-
viding ‘added value’ through tax services (Crest 2006). 
Some studies have explicitly considered the role of these 
firms in ‘secrecy jurisdictions’ (TJN 2010) – a preferred 
term over ‘tax havens’ since it gets to the heart of the 
matter in why corporate structures are located in par-
ticular sovereign jurisdictions – considering how the Big 
Four are part of a broader industry for tax avoidance 
(Sikka 2003; Murphy 2017, Wójcik 2013; Jones et al. 2017). 
Still, systematic research on the scale of their activity in 
these locations has been rare. Their exploitation of the 
‘offshore world’ has been peripherally observed (Palan 
2006, Palan et al, 2010, Shaxson 2011, Shaxson 2018) but 
their role has not been separately identified as providing, 
in itself, an explanation of both offshore finance and, 
conversely, an explanation of their own structures. We 
take on this challenge here.
An idea implicit in the nature of offshore is that the 
structure of the entity taking advantage of the oppor-
tunity it provides should be separated as far as possible 
3from the activity of both the beneficial owner of the ac-
tivity which it records and those who might regulate it 
(Murphy 2009). It follows that there would be a diffuse 
nature of control within these firms, with operating en-
tities in each jurisdiction rarely having apparent patterns 
of common ownership with those in other locations. The 
opacity common within offshore structures may well 
be replicated within firms heavily engaged in secrecy ju-
risdictions. Control of the offshore entity is maintained 
through structures that are not readily apparent. The 
same appears to be the case with those GPSFs working 
in the offshore world. Common codes of conduct; shared 
working practices; web-site styles and coherent man-
agement policies appear to characterize their behaviour 
even when conventional lines of control through owner-
ship structures are, apparently, absent.  The commonal-
ity of structures in the absence of apparent control has 
drawn our attention to system level implications. Ac-
counting technologies are crucial to the globalization of 
capital, including the role of large accounting firms as an 
effective ‘pinstripe mafia’ (Mitchell and Sikka 2011). From 
a legal perspective Picciotto (1992, 2011) provides the 
most comprehensive historical analysis of the interac-
tion of international business with diverse national legal 
and fiscal systems, explaining the grounds upon which 
corporate tax abuse is executed. What is apparent that 
this interface is not accidental in the case of these pro-
fessional firms: the boundaries between international 
action and local regulation is deliberately obscured, not 
least it would seem to make the difficulty in establishing 
accountability for their actions hard to establish, as our 
study evidences.  In this sense both structural and insti-
tutional analyses of these firms highlight system level 
prerequisites for the operation and proliferation of ‘glob-
al wealth chains’ (Seabrooke and Wigan 2014, 2017). 
The role of Big Four in providing tax services in secrecy ju-
risdictions has come under challenge since tax avoidance 
and secrecy jurisdictions were linked to the Global Finan-
cial Crisis (Sikka and Wilmott 2013; Haberly and Wójcik 
2017). From being largely overlooked, it has become an 
issue at the center of attention for governments and in-
ternational organizations, and new reforms are launched 
aimed at ensuring the tax base of multinational corpo-
rations (Seabrooke and Wigan 2016). This has happened 
at the backdrop of increased criticism of aggressive tax 
planning schemes from the civil society as well as media 
attention on the low tax rates of certain companies. This 
change in the public’s perception of tax planning could 
likely have prompted a strategic change amongst the ac-
counting firms. In order to protect their status as highly 
trusted authorities within the market for assurance and 
market and policy advice it is fundamentally important 
for them to continually be perceived as legitimate, thus 
enabling their extraction of rents. On the other hand, 
their clients might still have a demand for tax-optimizing 
products and services. This puts the Big Four firms into 
a dilemma. Whereas the environment was previously fa-
vorable towards them marketing more direct tax plan-
ning tools to their clients it is now being perceived as in-
creasingly illegitimate. We investigate how the Big Four 
has approached this challenge in their communication 
and whether the way they present themselves and their 
tax services has changed in response to the backdrop of a 
changing political landscape.
This working paper addresses the challenge of how the 
Big Four are located in offshore structures, how their 
structures are deliberately opaque, and what claims have 
been made to the legitimacy of their tax services over 
time. Our interest here is in mapping the presence of the 
Big Four to provide a topography of where they are par-
ticularly likely to offer tax products and services. Further, 
we are also interested in how they make claims about 
what tax products and services can be provided since 
the 1990s. This helps us to understand how isomorphic 
pressures exist at the level of structure and operations, 
as well as how a ‘mature field’ is maintained (Greenwood 
and Suddaby 2006), as well as how sensitive these GPSFs 
are to challenges (Seabrooke and Wigan 2015). 
In what follows we: i. outline the methodological ap-
proach and data for our study; ii. summarize the pres-
ence of the Big Four; iii. map their location in the interna-
tional political economy; iv. provide estimates on staffing 
in these locations; v. provide a case study of KPMG; and 
vi. we assess change over time we trace Big Four claims 
to providing tax services over time; vii we discuss the 
practical and regulatory implications of our findings. All 
summed these sections allow us to dig into the details 
of how one of the Big Four is structured as a GPSF that 
has a global presence, brand, and management strategy 
but is comprised of legally separated and distinct entities 
within itself to permit the firm to have maximal flexibili-
ty. Finally, we reflect on the role of the Big Four and other 
GPSFs and the presence of isomorphism in organization-
al structures in the international political economy.
I: Methodological Approach and Constraints
This study attempts to identify some of the key account-
ing information that is now recognized as necessary for 
the risk appraisal of a multinational corporation. The 
country-by-country reporting model adopted by the 
OECD in 2015 as the basis for tax authority risk appraisal 
of multinational corporations provides the methodology 
for this analysis (OECD, 2015). That risk appraisal mod-
el is based upon the collection of a limited range of ac-
counting and other data on the activity of a multinational 
corporation in each jurisdiction in which it operates. To 
enable the activities of the firm within the jurisdiction 
to be identified it requires that the parent organization 
of a multinational corporation disclose all those jurisdic-
tions in which it trades and provides a description of the 
organization’s activities in that place as well as a list of 
the organization’s subsidiaries operating in each such lo-
4cation. The intention is to identify the extent of the entity 
being appraised and the nature of its activities. Thereaf-
ter country-by-country reporting requires that a limited 
amount of accounting data be disclosed for each jurisdic-
tion including turnover, which must be split between that 
to third parties and that made to other group members; 
profit before tax; taxes on profit accrued and taxes on 
profit paid for a period; investment in tangible assets; net 
shareholder funds and, as an indication of the scale of ac-
tual economic activity being undertaken, the number of 
full-time employees engaged in the jurisdiction. Given the 
relative modest scale of country-by-country reporting’s 
indicators, and because this standard has become one to 
which the Big Four firms have necessarily had to subscribe 
since their clients are engaged in producing this informa-
tion, it was presumed to be an appropriate methodology 
for this study. 
In practice, it has not been possible to secure all the data 
necessary to undertake a full country-by-country report-
ing analysis of these firms. That is because whilst each of 
the Big Four firms does publish some financial informa-
tion on what they suggest to be the global scope of their 
operations, this data is limited in scope and does not cov-
er all the variables to which country-by-country report-
ing refers. While their brand and strategic oversight is as 
GPSFs, their reporting activities are not global. In partic-
ular, data on profits and taxes is not available for these 
firms’ global operations, and nor is most investment data. 
In addition, a relatively small number of exceptions apart, 
very little financial data is available on the operation of 
these firms in particular jurisdictions. In contrast to the 
practice of most publicly prominent trading entities, they 
publish almost no financial data on their web sites. This 
necessarily reduced the scope of the research. 
The research was further curtailed when it became ap-
parent that the description of what these firms do is very 
similar by location because the websites of most of these 
firms appear to be driven by a consistent template, itself 
a symbol of strong isomorphism (cf. Drori et al. 2016). 
Searching for any significant local variation in the descrip-
tion of services offered proved to be a largely fruitless ex-
ercise as a result. 
Given these limitations the research focus on four issues 
for the mapping element of our study.  These were iden-
tifying those jurisdictions in which each of the Big Four 
firms had offices; determining how many offices they had 
in each such location; confirming how many staff they 
had in each such jurisdiction and establishing what infor-
mation they disclosed as to the ownership of their local 
operations in each jurisdiction where they had a presence. 
In addition, information on the organization of one firm 
in particular (KPMG) was analyzed in detail, that it was 
noted that it was similar in most respects to the observe 
structure of the other four firms. 
The purpose of this work was fourfold.
First, the opacity of these firms was appraised. Given 
the importance of these firms to the operation of inter-
national financial markets, which markets are largely 
dependent upon the availability of audited financial in-
formation for the undertaking of investment appraisal, 
it would seem appropriate that consistent standards for 
disclosure should be applied to those firms undertaking 
those audits. Given the absence of financial data this issue 
has been considered by praising data on jurisdiction loca-
tions, office numbers and staff numbers. Each firm has 
published information on each of these issues. Determin-
ing whether, or not, this data could be verified on a coun-
try-by-country basis provides an indication of opacity.  
Second, the extent of these firms was appraised. This 
has become an issue of importance since they have been 
widely associated with the activities of what are com-
monly called tax havens or secrecy jurisdictions in which 
their presence appears to be commonplace. Given the 
known opacity of these locations determination of their 
presence within them appears to be a matter of impor-
tance.
Third, an indication of the significance of their activities 
in different locations, and whether or not this suggested 
that different types of activity were actually being under-
taken for different marketplaces in different locations 
was sought. Differing intensities of office provision and 
local employment against other indicators of economic 
activity provided a means of appraising this issue. 
Fourth, the organizational structure of these firms was 
appraised to suggest reasons why they might have been 
adopted.
For the second element of our study, tracing claims from 
Big Four firms in providing tax products and services, we 
employed a different strategy. This process entails using 
internet archives to find representative statements on 
the provision of tax services over time, and to then code 
the content of these statements. The aim here is to assess 
claims made to the global reach of tax services provided, 
the amount of detail provided in providing tax services 
linked to tax avoidance, and comments about the com-
plexity of international governance changes and trans-
parency requirements. We comment in greater detail on 
our coding system in the section below. But first we pro-
vide details on the scale of the Big Four.
II: The Big Four – a summary of their scale
To set the work into an appropriate context it is worth 
noting the scale of the firms being studied. A summary 
of the global income of these four firms in 2016, broken 
down between the consistent three main reported types 
of activity each undertakes, is as follows:
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Activity Deloitte PWC KPMG EY
US$’bn US$’bn US$’bn US$’bn
Assurance / audit 9.4 15.3 10.1 11.3
Advisory / consultancy 20.5 11.5 9.7 10.6
Tax 6.9 9.1 5.6 7.8
Total 36.8 35.9 25.4 29.7
Sources: Murphy and Stausholm 2017
To illustrate the extent to which these four firms domi-
nate the market, the next two largest firms are BDO and 
Grant Thornton, which had global turnovers of $7.6bn 
and $4.8bn respectively in the year in question. The dif-
ference in scale between the Big Four and all their com-
petitors is readily apparent. The global spread of this in-
come as reported by the firms is reported by them to be 
as follows:
Table 2
Deloitte PWC KPMG EY
US$’bn US$’bn US$’bn US$’bn
North America and the Caribbean 14.9
South and Central America 0.8
Americas 19.3 15.7 10.0 13.6
Central and Eastern Europe 0.7
Western Europe 12.3
Middle East and Africa 1.3
Europe/Middle East /Africa 12.3 14.3 11.4 11.8
Asia 4.4
Australasia and Pacific Islands 1.5
Asia 5.2 5.9 4.0 4.3
Total 36.8 35.9 25.4 29.7
Sources: As above. NB: only PWC provides the breakdown noted in italics.
This global spread is also apparent when their staff num-
bers are considered. Locating the number of staff in 
GPSFs, and how ‘transnational’ they are, is a topic of con-
siderable interest in recent years (Spence et al. 2015; Belal 
et al. 2017; Spence et al. 2018). This concerns comes from 
wishing to understand professionalization trends as well 
as career and social mobility (Duff 2017). We contribute 
to this literature. The firms report these to be as follows:
6Table 3
Deloitte PWC KPMG EY
Global headcount 244,445 223,468 188,982 230,800
Partners  11,122  10,830  9,843  Not known 
Professionals  193,199  177,182  147,028  189,111 
Admin staff  40,124  35,456  32,111  41,689 
 244,445  223,468  188,982  230,800 
Sources: As previously noted.
This data can be further analyzed as follows:
Table 4
Deloitte PWC KPMG EY
North America and the Caribbean  57,773 
South and Central America  13,110 
Americas  107,942  70,883  54,111  69,718 
Central and Eastern Europe  9,273 
Western Europe  69,627 
Middle East and Africa  13,036 
Europe/Middle East/Africa  86,574  91,936  96,404  112,871 
Asia  53,010 
Australasia and Pacific Islands  7,639 
Asia  49,929  60,649  38,467  48,211 
 244,445  223,468  188,982  230,800 
Sources: as above. Note: only PWC provides the breakdown noted in italics.
For comparisons sake, BDO have a global headcount 
of 67,7311 and Grant Thornton employ 42,000 people 
worldwide2. The Big Four are substantially bigger than 
their competitors in terms of the number of staff that 
they employ. As firms employing almost 900,000 peo-
ple worldwide and with a combined annual fee income 
exceeding US$127 billion in 2016 these firms are system-
ically important. The fact that each of the firms reports 
1  https://www.bdo.ee/en-gb/news/2016/bdo-global-revenues-rise-to-us$-7-6-billion accessed 24 May 2017
2  https://www.grantthornton.com/about-us/firm-facts.aspx accessed 24 May 2017
this particular data as if they are single entities operat-
ing on a multinational basis does indicate that each has 
a desire to appear to be suich an entity on occassion 
and that they are  perceived as such. They reinforce this 
perception by clearly having the ability to secure the 
necessary data to report information on a global basis. 
What they do not then do is supply the financial data 
that most organizations of that type would deliver the 
7both investors and stakeholders, which is a set of con-
solidated financial statements for the organization as 
a whole. It is the paradox of a structure that permits a 
perception of having the form of a multinational en-
tity whilst operating as firms that appear to only have 
local obligations that is at the heart of this research. 
III: Mapping the Big Four’s Presence
The first object of this research was to determine the 
extent of each of these firms. Each of the Big Four pub-
lished a list of the jurisdictions in which they suggest they 
operated at the time that this research was undertaken3. 
These lists provided a starting point for determining in 
which jurisdictions these firms are really located, and for 
assessing how many offices and employees they might 
have in each such location. This was not a straightfor-
ward task: the number of locations in which each firm 
worked and, perhaps less surprisingly, the number of 
offices in each jurisdiction is subject to fairly frequent 
change. Comparison of lists produced in September 2016 
and March 2017 found explicable change between them. 
3  Deloitte, https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/footerlinks/global-office-directory.html, PWC, https://
www.PWC.com/gx/en/about/office-locations.html ,  EY, http://www.ey.com/uk/en/ourlocations , KPMG 
https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/about/offices.html all accessed 24 May 2017
Harder to explain were the inconsistencies in the data the 
firms publish about themselves. Initial research revealed 
inconsistencies between the jurisdiction listings pub-
lished by the firms and other data that they published e.g. 
their annual Transparency Reports, which are the closest 
approximation to annual financial statements that they 
produce. These disparities required that these firms’ juris-
diction location reporting be checked in a number of ways. 
First, the variation between the Transparency Reports of 
each firm and the office location listings were compared. 
Thereafter web-based searches of LinkedIn and other 
sites, such as those of recruitment agents that the firms 
might use, were undertaken to provide further informa-
tion on office locations. Third, where such searches indi-
cated discrepancies with the office directories that the 
firms published investigation was pursued until it could 
be ascertained whether or not it was likely that a firm 
had a real presence in an otherwise undisclosed juris-
diction, or not. This process revealed the following data:
Table 5
Firm Number of 
jurisdictions 
where the firm 
usually says 
they are pres-
ent
Number of 
jurisdictions 
where we 
have found 
evidence of 
the firm being 
present
Total num-
ber of offices 
based on our 
research
Number of 
jurisdictions 
with a single 
office based 
on our re-
search
Average num-
ber of offices 
per jurisdic-
tion based on 
our research1
Deloitte 140 157 731 87 4.66
PWC 157 158 737 91 4.66
EY 155 159 710 95 4.47
KPMG 152 161 738 96 4.58
Total (where 
appropriate) 2,916
Sources: Authors’ estimates
1  Average number of offices per jurisdiction where they are present i.e. not including the ju-
risdictions where they are not present in calculating the average. If the jurisdictions where they 
are not present are included in the average the numbers are: 2.88, 2.91, 2.80, 2.92.
8Only PWC came close to publishing a reliable list of juris-
dictions in which they operate1. In the case of the other 
firms the differences are significant2. It should be noted 
that in every case there is under-disclosure. Based on 
1   The sole difference comes down to their listing Jersey and Guernsey as a single jurisdiction, which they call ‘The Chan-
nel Islands’. They are different locations and there is no recognizable jurisdiction called The Channel Islands. 
2   All discrepancies have been checked. For example, in the case of KPMG, that firm says it operates in Gabon but no evidence of it having an office 
there can be found. In contrast, other places not mentioned by KPMG in its 2016 international Transparency Report do appear to host its offices based 
on evidence from the internet. In three cases (Afghanistan, Greenland and Cuba) these appear to be simple omissions from both its international 
Transparency Report and its list of offices. In contrast, the KPMG Antigua and Barbuda office was mentioned in the 2016 KPMG Transparency Report 
but not in the office listing. The office in Syria managed the reverse, being included in the office listing but was not in the Transparency Report. In addi-
tion a number of locations were not listed in the Transparency Report because of what appears to be confusion as to their status. Hong Kong, Macau, 
Bonaire, Puerto Rico and some French territories appear to fall into this category although there appears to be no such concern with listing the UK’s 
Crown Dependencies as independent territories. The overall result is that KPMG appears to operate in 161 locations and not the 152 it suggested when 
the review was undertaken. 
this research Figure 1 indicates the global presence of 
the Big Four. As is clear, the overwhelming majority of 
countries in the world have at least three out of the four 
firms present, and all four are present in most countries.
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 1
9Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 2
Mere presence in a location can, however, be mis-
leading. To provide a better indication of the scale 
of activity by jurisdiction we sought to establish 
how many offices each firm had in each country in 
which they operated using the methods already not-
ed. Figure 2 shows the number of offices by location:
The disparity between the two maps makes clear that 
the Big Four only have a limited presence in many of the 
lower-income countries in the world. Figure 3 further 
illustrates this point, showing the top 25 countries in 
terms of the number of offices operated by the Big Four 
in aggregate. The USA tops this list and, with the excep-
tion of Malaysia, the jurisdictions where the Big Four 
have most offices are in the OECD or are BRICS coun-
tries. It may be unsurprising that the Big Four are heav-
ily represented in the largest economies and that their 
presence in many of the world’s poorest jurisdictions is 
limited but their over-representation in Nordic counties 
requires explanation. In these countries, alone in the 
world it seems, these firms provide services to the entire 
business community, whatever its size, and as such are 
located in many towns as well as major cities. So strong 
is this trend that the Big Four firms have 23 offices be-
tween them in Iceland, a country of just 336,000 people.
10
Figure 3 suggests on first glance that the presence of the 
Big Four firms is directly linked to the size of the market 
in the place in which they operate. To test whether is the 
case the number of offices was compared to market size 
measured in terms of both population and GDP. The evi-
dence that emerged was clear: the number of offices the 
Big Four operate in a jurisdiction is not proportional to the 
size of a country or its economy. Figure 4 shows the number 
of Big Four offices in a jurisdiction per head of population: 
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 3
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With the exception of the Nordic states, where local 
market conditions explain the apparent excess of of-
fices in proportion to economic need, the presence of 
secrecy jurisdictions in this list is its most obvious char-
acteristic. There is no definitive list of tax havens, or se-
crecy jurisdictions, on which all authorities agree. The 
list that we used is based on the Tax Justice Network 
Financial Secrecy Index.1 The implication would ap-
1   Tax Justice Network, Financial Secrecy Index 2018: https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2018-results 
pear to be that the Big Four firms are heavily over-rep-
resented in these locations in proportion to apparent 
local market size. The same trend was apparent when 
comparison with GDP with the exception that, Iceland 
apart, the Nordic countries disappeared from the list 
and secrecy jurisdictions became even more prominent.
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure 4
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It would appear from this review that, the Nordic coun-
tries apart, the Big Four firms serve large enterprises 
in major centers of population with the exception of 
those offices located in secrecy jurisdictions. Secrecy 
jurisdictions have been defined as places that inten-
tionally create regulation for the primary benefit and 
use of those not resident in their geographical domain 
with that regulation being designed to undermine the 
legislation or regulation of another jurisdiction and 
with the secrecy jurisdictions also creating a deliberate, 
legally backed veil of secrecy that ensures that those 
from outside the jurisdiction making use of its regula-
tion cannot be identified to be doing so (Murphy, 2009). 
If this is the case the secrecy jurisdiction offices do not, 
then, service local need and it is secrecy and not local 
economic activity that drives presence in these places. 
IV: Locating the Big Four’s Staff
The number of offices that a firm maintains in a location 
is one indicator of the scale of its operations, but not a 
wholly adequate one since an office could in principle be 
just a few people, or a large-scale operation. Research 
showed that there are offices of Big Four firms with few-
er than 10 staff employed and others with thousands. As 
a result research was undertaken to establish the num-
ber of staff employed by each firm in each jurisdiction in 
which they are located to more reliably determine the 
significance of each.  In many cases the local web page 
of a Big Four firm provided information on the number 
of staff (and sometimes partners) engaged in a jurisdic-
tion. When this data was not available the necessary 
information on employee numbers was researched in 
the firms’ transparency reports, sustainability reports, 
annual reports (if published) or in the recruitment ma-
terials that they publish. If these sources did not provide 
the required data then the LinkedIn page for the firm was 
checked instead. These combined sources were consid-
ered to be primary data sources for research purposes.
When primary data sources did not secure data on staff 
numbers for a jurisdiction alternative, secondary, sources 
were used. These included newspaper articles, descrip-
tions from top employer awards, job listings, Facebook 
pages and even the personal resume of an HR official. 
Finally, if none of these sources could be found, but the 
company provided data in a range on LinkedIn resorted 
was made to using the mid-point in the range the firm 
suggested appropriate - meaning that if, for example, 
a LinkedIn listing for the firm suggested it had between 
51 and 200 employees, we erred on the side of a con-
servative estimate and recorded it as having 125 staff. 
This, inevitably, data was approximate in some cases.
2   This introduces a limitation since the places where they are present but there are no data available is possibly the places of secrecy juris-
dictions. These places include Andorra, Brunei, Cook Islands, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Monaco, St Vincent and the Grenadines, the Seychelles 
and Turks and Caicos Islands, which are all places ranked relatively high (above 70) in the Tax Justice Network Financial Secrecy Index.
Using these combined methods the number of staff in 
61 per cent of known locations of all firms could be de-
termined. These 61 per cent of locations represented 91 
per cent of the declared number of global employees. 
Since this relative failure to locate staff risked skewing 
comparative analysis of the Big Four firms missing data 
was then imputed where sufficient data on firm presence 
and office numbers and the number of staff employed 
by other firms in the location for which imputation 
was to take place made this possible using the formula:
Imputed staffic = Global sizei x Average local sizeBc x Number of officesic
The global size of the firm is the relative size of the firm’s 
global staff number relative to the average; average lo-
cal office size is based on the number of staff per office 
for the firms where we could find the data, and number 
of offices is the number of offices for that firm in that 
country. B indicates the average of the Big Four; i indi-
cates the individual firm and c indicates the country. The 
imputed staff number is therefore based upon the size 
of the firms in the countries where data is available cor-
rected for differences between firm size and number of 
offices. Testing that it is a reasonable assumption that 
office size of each firm would be close to the average 
office size for the other firms in the same jurisdiction 
shows correlations that are very close to 1 and significant 
at the 99 per cent level of confidence. This enabled im-
putation to increase the number of locations for which 
staff numbers could be suggested to 82 per cent of ju-
risdictions representing 97 per cent of employees. The 
imputed figures are only used in the ranking of staff al-
location so that the figures for total presence of the Big 
Four in each country is not skewed by missing data. For 
analysis on individual office size per firm, we have only 
relied on the actual observed staff figures. There re-
main jurisdictions where lack of data for any of the four 
firms means no imputation is possible. These countries 
only appear in analyses of office data as a consequence.2
The proportion of staff located for each firm by 
the different means noted above were as follows:
13
As is apparent, EY is the most opaque firm on this issue. Using these methods it was 
possible to locate a significant proportion of the global staff number for each firm:
Sources: as noted above.
Figure 5
Figure 6
Sources: as noted above.
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Sources: as noted above.
Figure 7
Note that slightly more staff were located for Deloitte than 
they declare that they employ. The top 25 locations for num-
bers of employees in aggregate are as follows:
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Sources: as noted above.
Figure 8
Secrecy jurisdictions again feature prominently, alongside 
some locations with low GDP per capita. These rankings 
reveal a recurring pattern: the Big Four firms appear to 
have disproportionately more staff - and therefore, pre-
sumably, disproportionately more activity - in countries 
that are known to be secrecy jurisdictions. This over-rep-
resentation is not explained by the size of the market as 
proxied by population and GDP. As a result it is at least 
possible that it is the secrecy provided by these places 
that prompts the Big Four to have such a strong presence 
within them. 
To ensure that the size of a jurisdiction is not biasing this 
finding, and based on awareness that most (but not all) 
secrecy jurisdictions are smaller countries (considered for 
this purpose to be those jurisdictions with populations 
of less than 3 million) data was also tested for all small 
jurisdictions, representing 112 locations in total of which 
40 are considered to be secrecy jurisdictions. The average 
number of staff employed per office of a Big Four firm in a 
small state was 112 people, compared to a worldwide av-
erage of 315 per office. In secrecy jurisdictions in general 
the average number of employees per office was 416, and 
in a small secrecy jurisdiction it was 239. There are above 
average numbers of employee per office in all secrecy 
jurisdictions: it is likely that this is because secrecy juris-
diction offices do not serve a natural, local, geographic 
hinterland but can instead be concentrated in a few loca-
tions to service an international clientele located outside 
the jurisdiction.
The proportion of total Big Four employees relative to 
population size, however, reveals a very different pic-
ture, as was the case with the analysis of office pres-
ence. Figure 8 shows the top jurisdictions according 
to the ratio of employees to population in a jurisdic-
tion. Secrecy jurisdictions are prominent in the list:
If the number of staff of the Big Four firms 
in aggregate is compared with GDP in a lo-
cation the top 15 jurisdictions are as follows:
Figure 9
Sources: as noted above.
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V: The creation of opacity: a case study on KPMG
The scale of opacity that these survey findings revealed 
suggested that the mechanisms for the creation of this 
veil of secrecy required investigation. KPMG was used as 
a case study for these purposes, although the extensive 
work undertaken in reviewing data from the other firms 
suggested it likely that similar findings could have been 
made in each case1. 
KPMG has a structure similar to that of the other Big Four 
firms: each has a central organizing body that appears to 
control its intellectual property, license members of the 
network and enforce common standards. Three of the 
Big Four locate the company responsible for this activity 
in London. The companies in question are Deloitte Tou-
che Tohmatsu Limited2, a UK private company limited by 
guarantee that regulates the Deloitte network3; Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers International Limited4, which is again a 
UK private company limited by guarantee, for PWC5 and 
yet another such company, Ernst & Young Global Limit-
ed6 for EY7. 
The use of these similar structures does not appear to 
be coincidence: UK companies limited by guarantee 
have a particular appeal for these networks for three 
reasons. First, because membership of such companies 
does not necessarily result in a right to receive income, 
changes of ownership rarely give rise to capital gains tax 
charges, meaning that the tax situation when there are 
membership changes is simple. Second, if a company is 
organized using this structure, which is commonly used 
by membership and charitable organizations, it is easy to 
argue that the firm does not trade but just undertakes 
mutual activities on behalf of the members that should 
not then be subject to UK tax. These companies appear 
to take advantage of this opportunity. Third, as a result, 
the accounting disclosures required by UK law are min-
1   KPMG was chosen as it has more secrecy jurisdiction offices than any other firm.
2  https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/07271800/filing-history ac-
cessed 27 May 2017: the 2017 accounts give no hint of the company’s role
3  https://www2.deloitte.com/content/campaigns/global/global-report/index.html accessed 27 May 2017
4  See https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03590073/filing-history accessed 27 May 2017. The UK accounting requirements for 
this company are now so limited that it just files two pages of data as its annual accounts for the year to 30 June 2016. In 2009 it was six. 
5   See https://www.PWC.com/gx/en/about/corporate-governance/network-structure.html accessed 27 May 2017
6   https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04328808/filing-history accessed 27 May 2017. Perhaps refreshingly only EY chose not to go for 
the absolute minimum possible level of disclosure in their 2016 annual accounts, although that does not mean much insight is obtained as a result. 
7   http://www.ey.com/gl/en/about-us/our-global-approach/global-review accessed 27 May 2017
8   The term is used loosely here: it means a mutual entity run solely for the benefit of its members and is like-
ly to work in very similar way to the UK companies limited by guarantee used by the other Big Four firms. 
9   See https://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/1710Z:SW-kpmg-international-cooperative/switzerlnad accessed 2 May 2017
10  See https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/about/offices/zurich-1.html accessed 2 May 2017
11  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KPMG accessed 2 May 2017
12  See https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/lu/pdf/lu-en-Transparency-Report-2016.pdf pages 28 - 30 accessed 2 May 2017
imal: the latest PWC accounts for the noted company 
only just extend onto a second page. The whole structure 
is, therefore, highly opaque. A UK base, UK law, and UK 
tax arrangements can all be taken advantage of and yet 
almost nothing need be disclosed as to what these com-
panies really do. 
KPMG does not, however, use such a company. In its case 
the coordinating entity is a Swiss cooperative8 called 
KPMG International Cooperative.  Bloomberg9 suggests 
that this entity is registered at the KPMG office in Zu-
rich10. Other sources suggest that it is registered in the 
Swiss Canton of Zug11. Based on the survey undertak-
en for this report every single KPMG firm mentions this 
Swiss entity on its website. The relationship is also de-
scribed in the Transparency Reports that some of those 
KPMG firms publish. For example, the KPMG firm in Lux-
embourg says in its Transparency Report (in a statement 
remarkably similar to those in many other such reports) 
that12:The independent member firms of the KPMG net-
work (including KPMG Luxembourg, Société coopérative) 
are affiliated with KPMG International, a Swiss coopera-
tive which is a legal entity formed under Swiss law. 
KPMG International carries on business activities for 
the overall benefit of the KPMG network of member 
firms but does not provide professional services to 
clients. Professional services to clients are exclusively 
provided by its member firms.
The structure is designed to support consistency of 
service quality and adherence to agreed values wher-
ever in the world the member firms operate. One of 
the main purposes of KPMG International is to facil-
itate the provision by member firms of high quality 
Audit, Tax and Advisory services to their clients. For 
example, KPMG International establishes and facili-
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tates the implementation and maintenance of uni-
form policies and standards of work and conduct by 
member firms and protects and enhances the use of 
the KPMG name and brand
The implication is clear: there is a unity within this struc-
ture and yet at the same time there is a considerable de-
gree of separation within the firm. That this separation 
may not be as stark as the legal wording implies is sug-
gested by the job titles of those working for the global 
operation, such as ‘Global Head of Audit’ and ‘Global 
Head of Advisory’13. These suggest a degree of coordina-
tion in such activities that is contrary to the impression 
of a diversely controlled firm14. The substance of the firm 
may not, in other words, be what the form implies, which 
would indicate a case of organizational ‘decoupling’ un-
der isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan 1977). There is oth-
er evidence of this conflict between the substance and 
form of the firm. For example, the actual operational 
structure of KPMG may be a little more complex than 
the published statements suggest: it appears that the 
functional control of KPMG internationally actually rests 
in the Netherlands. This is the international address pro-
vided for KPMG International supplied by the UK-based 
KPMG LLP as part of its regulatory filings15. Despite this, 
remarkably little attention or publicity is given to this 
operation. The 2016 KPMG global annual review gives no 
hint, for example, of a contact address for this head office 
operation, despite which it appears to have considerable 
power. As the entirely typical Luxembourg Transparency 
Report16, already noted, says:
KPMG is the registered trademark of KPMG Interna-
tional and is the name by which the member firms 
are commonly known. The rights of member firms 
to use the KPMG name and marks are contained 
within agreements with KPMG International. 
In these agreements, member firms commit them-
selves to a common set of KPMG Values. Under 
agreements with KPMG International, member 
firms are required to comply with KPMG Interna-
tional’s policies and regulations including quality 
standards governing how they operate and how 
they provide services to clients. This includes hav-
ing a structure that ensures continuity and stability 
and being able to adopt global and regional strat-
egies, share resources, service multinational clients, 
manage risk, and deploy global methodologies and 
tools. Each member firm takes responsibility for its 
13  https://home.kpmg.com/uk/en/home/about/leadership-governance.html accessed 27 May 2017
14  Titles taken from https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/iar/international-annual-review-2016.pdf accessed 2 May 2017
15  See http://www.auditregister.org.uk/Forms/OfficeList.aspx?ID=2548845&DisplayText=-
Firm%20Detail%20(Offices)&ParentText=All%20Firms accessed 2 May 2017
16  An almost identical statement will be found in the International Transparency Report for 2016, see https://assets.
kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/12/international-supplementary-report-2016.pdf accessed 2 May 2017
17  https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/about/overview/leadership.html accessed 27 May 2017
management and the quality of its work.
The report goes on to list the sanctions available for use 
by KPMG against non-compliant member firms. The re-
sulting paradox is readily apparent: KPMG is structured 
as if it is made up of individual member firms and yet 
each of these has to operate to common standards that 
are rigorously enforced. There are also common financial 
interests: KPMG firms, for example, share a common cap-
tive professional indemnity insurance operation (whose 
location has not at present been identified). 
Despite this, all is also not apparently equal within the 
KPMG organization. As the same Luxembourg Trans-
parency Report notes when discussing the KPMG gover-
nance structure:
The key governance and management bodies of 
KPMG International are the Global Council, the 
Global Board, and the Global Management Team.
The Global Council focuses on high-level gover-
nance tasks and provides a forum for open discus-
sion and communication among member firms. 
It includes representation from 58 member firms 
that are ‘members’ of KPMG International as a 
matter of Swiss law. Sub-licensees are generally 
indirectly represented by a member.
This reference to there being 58 core members makes 
clear that there are tiers of membership within the KPMG 
structure that are not at all apparent to the public. It 
also suggests that KPMG’s operations in more than 100 
countries may actually be operated under sub-license 
from other jurisdictions, although which operations have 
which status is not clear.  This two-tier structure may be 
particularly important when considering KPMG’s secre-
cy jurisdiction operations. These do not appear to play 
any significant part in KPMG’s governance structure17. 
This may imply that the regulation of these sub-licensed 
KPMG practices is undertaken from non-secrecy jurisdic-
tion locations. This may be a precedent for the regulation 
of activity in these locations by other parties.  
The situation is confused by the fact that it has not proved 
possible to identify the ownership of all KPMG offices. In 
the case of 106 websites, each representing a different 
national firm, a named local entity was identified as the 
local KPMG firm, it then being stated that KPMG Interna-
tional, based in Switzerland, was the international orga-
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nization of which it was a member. The firms in question 
represented 648 (87.7 per cent) of KPMG offices and 95.2 
per cent of all KPMG staff. There were exceptions to con-
trol by a national entity. For example, KPMG Azerbaijan 
Limited that runs the KPMG operation in that country is a 
company incorporated in Guernsey18 whilst the structure 
of KPMG India is particularly obscure. The local website19 
makes clear that ownership is by an Indian partnership 
but its Transparency Report20 says:
KPMG is a partnership firm registered under the 
Indian Partnership Act 1932. The two legal part-
ners in KPMG are two companies incorporated 
in the Netherlands: KPMG International Invest-
ments BV (a wholly owned subsidiary of KPMG 
International Cooperative) and KPMG Advisory 
NV (a company which is part of the KPMG Eu-
rope LLP group of companies). However, both 
such companies hold the interests in KPMG ul-
timately for, and at the direction of, KPMG In-
ternational Cooperative, a Swiss cooperative 
which is a legal entity formed under Swiss law 
(“KPMG International”).Notwithstanding the 
legal ownership structure, KPMG   International 
and/or the legal partners do not manage or ex-
ercise control over the management of KPMG or 
extract profit from KPMG. 
Who might actually benefit from the ownership of KPMG 
India is not made clear. What is apparent is that KPMG 
International participates in the creation of the opacity 
about who does so. Other variations in local form exist. 
There are, for example, a number of regional (rather than 
local) firms. KPMG East Africa, which is incorporated in 
Mauritius, operates a number of KPMG offices. The offic-
es in a group of mainly Dutch Caribbean locations also 
appear to be under common control. The small KPMG 
office in the British Virgin Islands appears to control the 
KPMG office in St Lucia. Whether the offices of KPMG in 
the Channel Islands are one or two firms is not clear: one 
seems to be likely. The operation of some of the KPMG 
Offices in the Balkans is undertaken by locally located 
companies but these are then subsidiaries of a company 
called KPMG CEE Limited, a company incorporated in Cy-
prus. None of these structures appear to replicate each 
other: diversity at the local level is characteristic of the 
operation, as far as can be ascertained. However, since in 
55 locations the website does not say what entity is rep-
resenting KPMG in the jurisdiction in which an office is lo-
cated the extent to which such diversity exists cannot be 
stated with certainty. In the jurisdictions where the web-
18  https://home.kpmg.com/az/en/home/about.html accessed 2 May 2017
19  https://home.kpmg.com/in/en/home/careers.html accessed 2 May 2017
20  https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/06/India-Transparency-Report-2016.pdf accessed 2 May 2017
21  http://www.auditregister.org.uk/Forms/OfficeList.aspx?ID=2548845&DisplayText=-
Firm%20Detail%20(Offices)&ParentText=All%20Firms accessed 2 May 2017
22  https://www.irs.gov/uac/kpmg-to-pay-456-million-for-criminal-violations 
site does not identify a local operating company there is 
invariably a reference to the website being operated by 
KPMG International. The locations in question represent 
91 offices (12.3 per cent of the total) but just 4.8 per cent 
of identified staff, although it should be noted that there 
is a much higher incidence of being unable to identify 
staff working in these locations than in those in which 
ownership can be determined.  The largest of these offic-
es where ownership is unclear is in Brazil; there appears 
to be a general culture of secrecy that is quite marked in 
South American affiliates. 
One tradition once associated with the accountancy pro-
fession was the use of partnership structures. This pat-
tern of behavior has been subject to fairly rapid regulato-
ry and cultural change in recent years, encouraged by the 
growing availability of limited liability partnership struc-
tures. It appears that just 21 KPMG locations representing 
62 offices, or just 8.4 per cent of all offices now operate as 
partnerships with unlimited liability. 
What this case study suggests is that KPMG has a decep-
tive structure. For marketing and public perception pur-
poses it appears to be a conventional, centrally controlled 
and remarkably homogenous organization. Beneath that 
veneer its national operations are, however, subject to 
separate ownership, although the identities of many of 
these separate entities are not publicly disclosed. The im-
plications of this chosen structure are profound.
As KPMG LLP’s  UK regulatory filings suggest21, the main-
tenance of a local operation means that regulatory obli-
gations can be geographically curtailed. The firm is only 
registered to provide services in the UK, Jersey, Guernsey, 
the Isle of Man, Japan and the USA. This saves on costs. 
Legal risk is also ring-fenced by the chosen structure: in 
principle the failing of one member firm - whether for fi-
nancial reasons due to operational difficulties or, perhaps 
more likely, as a result of catastrophic liability arising as 
a result of a successful professional negligence claim or 
from a colossal regulatory failing - may not prove to be a 
risk for the whole organization because of the structure 
used. As an example, the $456 million fine imposed on 
KPMG in the USA in 2005 for criminal tax violations22 did 
not appear to have consequences for other member firms 
in the international organization. There is, then, some 
evidence that this structure works for this ring-fencing 
purpose.
There are other regulatory advantages as well that may 
be less obvious. What the structure adopted allows each 
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member firm to argue that it only has liability to its own 
clients and to its own regulators. This in turn does, how-
ever, mean that it might be able to prevent the disclosure 
of client related documentation to regulators outside its 
own jurisdiction, whether for tax or other purposes. As 
a result the maintenance of client confidentiality in the 
face of regulatory investigation is much easier to secure. 
While there may be several factors behind the choice of 
structure, this model enables the firms limited regulato-
ry and legal liability as well as ring-fences client activity 
from enquiry, all of which are helpful devices in ensuring 
their ability to avoid scrutiny into their tax services to 
corporate clients. 
VI:Big Four claims to the provision of tax services
Understanding how GPSFs legitimate their positions in 
the international political economy is important in un-
derstanding how isomorphic pressures change over time. 
For the Big Four and professionals dealing with tax ser-
vices more generally, there has been considerable moral 
pressure in recent years (Radcliffe et al. 2018). To analyze 
the extent to which there has been a change in commu-
nication by the firms, we undertake a qualitative content 
analysis of their description of their services. In order to 
get a time dimension of their services we use the Way-
back Machine, which archives web pages. Previous work 
on the Internet pages of the Big Four traced their diver-
sification into new markets, especially into global legal 
services (Wilkins and Ferrer 2018). Our interest was in 
their core activities in providing tax services. We search 
the saved web pages from the home pages of the Big 
Four firms that describe their tax services. By obtaining 
these saved web pages we are able to collect data on how 
they present these services from 1997 to 2019, a period in 
which the international political landscape regarding tax 
changed significantly. 
What we looked for are the pages where the firm commu-
nicates publicly about their services. Of course, it might 
reasonably be that part of the change in strategy was to 
move communication away from the web pages and into 
more direct, targeted communication with the clients. It 
might also be that differences over time arose as a result 
of changes in the strategic use of the Internet in the period 
studied. The ideal data for our purpose would have been a 
fixed type of publication that the GPSFs used throughout 
the period to communicate their services with adapted 
and updated content over time. Corporate web pages are 
the closest we come towards such a publication, as they 
are continually updated and throughout the period have 
the characteristic of being targeted towards clients but 
are also publicly available, the latter being important for 
our purpose of analyzing how these firms project their le-
gitimacy in the public sphere.
There are some considerations regarding the use of web 
archive materials for research that are important to men-
tion. First of all, the web archive used does not as such 
“save” the entire Internet but rather works as a lobster 
trap, meaning it saves some pages, some of the time. 
Therefore there are holes in our timeline, where we can-
not find each page in each year. Furthermore, the date of 
the saving does not mean this was the date that particu-
lar content was published. We cannot therefore say any-
thing about exactly when changes were made. Instead 
we can get a view of how pages have changed over time. 
These web materials allow us to follow the trajectories of 
how the firms have adapted their communication about 
their services to the changing political dynamic regarding 
tax. The texts reviewed have been written and published 
in a time when there has been increasing contestation 
of the issue of international corporate taxation. Over 
the period increased scrutiny has been placed on the tax 
strategies of multinational corporations. The marketing 
of these services reflects the reaction to changes in pres-
sures on the Big Four GPSFs.
The number of documents per year varies from only 
around one per firm to almost 30 documents in a year. 
The reason for this degree in difference is primarily due to 
the nature of the archive, where fewer pages were saved 
during the earlier periods subject to study. The variation 
is also driven by the fact that the web pages sometimes 
Fig. 10. Number of coded documents 
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became more detailed as time progressed and included 
more sub-pages. Even if the pages held the same content, 
changing the architecture of the web page to create dif-
ferent subpages would create more documents, as each 
page is saved separately. The number of documents cod-
ed in each year is therefore a factor that does not nec-
essarily convey anything about the level of information 
we are given by the firms, and obviously not the nature 
of that information. We take the number of coded docu-
ments into account when reporting our results by report-
ing ratios rather than sums of documents with specific 
characteristics.
Each text passage from the web archives has been cod-
ed at two levels. We coded individual phrases and con-
cepts signifying concrete areas of tax, such as “transfer 
pricing”, “controlled foreign corporations” or “profit re-
mittance”. On this very concrete level we can track the 
development of the specific services being presented or 
which areas of tax were being emphasized. This does not 
enable an analysis of the fact that often these concrete 
aspects were not mentioned at all, and were instead re-
placed with rather vague phrases about corporate strat-
egy or the general importance of cost management for 
businesses. In order to account for this type of communi-
cation, we also coded each web page at a more abstract 
level. Each of these pages were coded as belonging to one 
of four categories depending on how direct the text was 
regarding the objective of tax service provision.
Vagueness versus directness was chosen as a signifier 
based on the assumption that it was less the underlying 
practice and more the communication surrounding the 
services that had likely changed in the period. Alterna-
tively we could have identified different purposes of tax 
services and analyzed these. However in the instances 
that the purpose or objective of tax services is stated di-
rectly, it is quite one-dimensional: it is clear that there are 
not multiple competing objectives but rather different 
ways of saying that the objective is to limit tax payments 
for multinational corporations. The only cases that can 
be pointed to as being different in terms of objective are 
cases where the text also promises to limit “reputational 
risk” and to adhere to new standards of transparency. We 
view these as additional objectives to the aim of limiting 
tax, as these would hardly be relevant if the first objective 
was not pursued. A firm that does not seek to limit its 
tax burden should probably not have to worry about the 
reputational risks of aggressive tax practices.  
We create a scale of vagueness/directness based on these 
observations. The categories are outlined in Table 6, be-
low, along with quotes that exemplify the text passages 
coded under this type of category. In the first category 
the text would be very direct and specifically mention 
lower tax rates. In the next category, vague terms such as 
“tax effectiveness” or “agile tax strategy” would be used. 
In category three, the text is so vague that it barely serves 
any purpose beyond confirming that the firm has tax ser-
vices for companies. No specific objective is advertised. In 
the last category, the text is equally vague when it comes 
to the objective of tax services but adds to the vagueness 
by enveloping it into phrases more concerned with trans-
parency and corporate responsibility. 
Category Illustrative quotes 
1. Direct aim specifica-
tion 
“OUR OBJECTIVE: MINIMIZING YOUR WORLDWIDE TAX BURDEN 
Whether your company is U.S. or foreign based, reducing your worldwide tax 
burden rests on three fundamental concepts: reducing taxes in the countries 
in which you do business, minimizing taxes on the repatriation of profits, and 
integrating your worldwide planning to maximize the benefits of tax-saving 
strategies.“
www.ey.com 1997
2. Vague aim specifica-
tion
“Our mission at the KPMG Tax Practice is to help our clients plug those leaks 
and re-balance the value flow. Because we understand tax, and have the cre-
ativity and the technical mastery to devise swift, tax-efficient responses to 
business, legislative and regulatory changes, we can help clients achieve and 
maintain optimal adaptation to their tax environments whatever their inter-
national reach.”
www.kpmg.co.uk  2002 
Table 6: Coding of Big Four Tax Services from Corporate Web Pages
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We observe a clear time trend in the way the Big Four 
present themselves to clients and the public in terms 
of their tax services, where they have in recent years 
stepped towards fewer explicit and implicit mentions of 
their ability to lower global tax rates of multinationals 
and has in turn increased their mentions of tax transpar-
ency and regulation. This is also what we observe in Fig-
ure 12, where the average score (1-4) of documents coded 
is shown over time. Here, the time trend is clear that the 
firms are moving away from directly marketing their abil-
ity to lower the taxes of corporations. 
3. No mention of con-
crete tax services or 
aims of services
“Globalisation has increased the importance of international tax issues. 
Through our international network, we remain abreast of foreign tax and 
business developments, permitting us to develop cross-boundary tax planning 
strategies. We are focused on identifying, developing and disseminating state-
of-the-art and multicountry tax planning ideas.”
www.pwcglobal.com 2000
4. Framing tax services 
around transparency 
and corporate respon-
sibility in relation to 
tax 
“Effective compliance and open, transparent reporting are the foundations of 
a successful tax function. Tax strategies that align with the needs of your busi-
ness and recognize the potential of change are crucial to sustainable growth. 
So we create highly networked teams who can advise on planning, compliance 
and reporting and maintain effective tax authority relationships — wherever 
you operate.”
www.ey.com 2008
When coding for these four categories we find that there 
are distinct differences in how directly the services are be-
ing marketed over the period. Figure 11 illustrates the de-
velopment over the period studied. In the first five years, 
a clear majority of texts describe very clearly the aim of 
minimizing taxes. This is well put in the 1998 edition of 
the KPMG web page in which they state: “Our aim is to 
ensure that each client pays no more tax than the law 
requires.” While that specific formulation is not found in 
later publications, the sentiment holds for a long time and 
as late as 2010 and 2011 the web page clearly states how 
the firm will “generate real cash tax savings for clients” 
through transfer pricing, and “reduce the group’s overall 
tax rate”. These direct statements however have become 
far less frequent. After 2003, the second category that is 
a bit more vague takes over, and becomes the dominat-
ing one. After 2010, there are barely any web pages where 
direct references to lower taxes can be found. In the time 
since 2013, the texts have become even more vague, with 
category 3 being the one we have coded most text to be-
longing. As for the fourth category that directly engages 
with transparency and morality, this is something that 
we do see, with more and more references to in the last 5 
years but, even so, it is still in the minority. 
Figure 11. Relative number of times each category is used
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VII:Implications
The country-by-country reporting risk assessment crite-
ria adopted by the OECD and used to inform the meth-
odology for this research highlights the fact that the 
choices made by the Big Four firms of accountants may 
be entirely deliberate. It is apparent from this study that 
the structures used by these firms prevent those with 
interest in their affairs from ascertaining much data on 
them. Few will go the lengths that this working paper has 
to secure information on their activities.
It is entirely plausible that the structure was simply cho-
sen to deliver opacity. Because of the structure of dis-
persed ownership that these firms use no single firm with-
in them these firms clearly believe has the responsibility 
to produce consolidated accounts for these networks as 
a whole, or as a result to prepare country-by-country re-
porting for tax authorities. It has been suggested (Mur-
phy and Stausholm, 2017) that the structure that they 
have adopted may be in breach of European Union ac-
counting requirements. The 2013 EU directive on financial 
statements requires the production of group accounts by 
a parent undertaking that controls subsidiary undertak-
ings.23 Control is the key word in this context. Sub-para-
graph 31 of the preamble to the 2013 Directive24 says that 
control should be based on holding a majority of voting 
rights, but that “control may also exist where there are 
agreements with fellow shareholders or members” and 
that  “in certain circumstances control may be effectively 
exercised where the parent holds a minority or none of 
the shares in the subsidiary”. It also says that “Member 
States should be entitled to require that undertakings 
not subject to control, but which are managed on a uni-
fied basis or have a common administrative, managerial 
or supervisory body, be included in consolidated financial 
23  See Article 2(9) at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0034 accessed 14 June 2017
24  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0034 accessed 14 June 2017
25  Including by organization theorists for its influence on professional cultures, see Hallett 2003.
statements”. We suggest there is a unified basis if man-
agement exists under a common name and that com-
mon administrative standards are in use that are over-
seen by a supervisory body. In that case it is by the finest 
of regulatory arbitrages that the Big Four GPSFs do not 
need to produce such statements.
This logic of using regulatory arbitrage to create a distinc-
tion between regulatory form and commercial function 
does in fact appear to be at the heart of the whole struc-
ture that these firms use. By the use of contractual ar-
rangements the firm prevents disclosure as to its activity 
whilst as previously noted, limits the scope of regulation 
imposed upon it; creates limits to liability to authorities 
for information held whilst increasing the barriers that 
protest client confidentiality and at the same time mit-
igates risk.
Risk mitigation exists in a number of ways. One is by 
creating individual member firms that might be ‘eject-
ed’ from membership of the overall organization in the 
event of catastrophic failure. The lessons of Arthur An-
dersen’s failure after its audit of Enron may have been 
noted,25 as it was a more integrated form than the others 
at that time. But the risk that is ring fenced is also repu-
tational. As is now recognized, the use of secrecy jurisdic-
tions is largely motivated by the creation of contractual 
arrangements that result in the artificial relocation of 
profit from the place where the economic substance of 
its creation arises to a different location where it may be 
recorded. The Big Four are integral to this process: with-
out their presence in the locations where this record of 
relocated profit takes place the transactions in question 
could not always be audited, and the audit requirement 
on the multinational corporations that undertake such 
activity is nearly universal. This relocation does, however, 
Figure 12. Average score on vagueness/directness scale
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create risk for all parties because of the potential that the 
relocation may be deemed to be artificial. This is precise-
ly what the country-by-country reporting risk appraisal 
technique is intended to discover by providing an indica-
tion of the real locus of economic activity. If at any point 
such activity ceases to be politically or commercially ex-
pedient for reputational reasons then it would be entire-
ly possible for a Big Four firm to exit these markets by 
simply giving notice to their members in the places where 
such relocation of profit is recorded that they were no 
longer required in the network of firms that these enti-
ties are. Breaking the commercial contracts would then 
expedite change without any obligation to the central 
organization.
This then suggests a further motive for these structures. 
Organized as franchises that exploit the capital of others 
to support the actual commercial activity of the organi-
zation at a local level they do then represent rent-seeking 
entities arbitraging legal and commercial law to max-
imize returns for a central core of activity, much activ-
ity within what appears to be the entity is in fact little 
more than rent contributing activity that result in legal 
obligation to maintain the core. KPMG’s structure of 58 
member firms with entities in about 100 other jurisdic-
tions being sub-franchisees strongly supports this sug-
gestion that even within the organization rent seeking 
takes place.
In that case opacity has another value: the local organi-
zation may well be wholly unable to appraise the relative 
contribution it makes to the central, rent seeking, entity 
by comparison with other, similar, entities in other ju-
risdictions. Contractual arrangements may well prevent 
the sharing of that information in such an organization. 
In that case opacity reinforces the goal of the core entity 
both within and outside the organization.
What is created as a result is, however, a wholly different 
type of commercial organization. Identifiable only by its 
franchise name, and unidentifiable as to the true bene-
ficiaries of the ownership of that franchise, the entity is 
bifurcated by regulatory arbitrage to create ring fences to 
protect the rent seeking activity it pursues from as many 
elements of actual commercial activity as it can achieve 
to the point where opacity is required to prevent detec-
tion of the fact that the entity as such does little more 
than protect itself from those risks that its franchisees 
are left to bear. 
Conclusions
Our study suggests that the relationship between the 
Big Four and secrecy jurisdictions has been complex, and 
that the interaction between the two has itself assist-
ed these GPSFs from hiding the true scope and scale of 
their offshore activities, including the provision of tax 
avoidance services. In addition, as our textual analysis 
of the websites of these firms over time shows, their de-
scription of the taxation services that they supply has 
changed significantly over time, largely, it would seem, 
in reaction to the changing fortunes of the secrecy juris-
diction locations in which they operate. This does not ap-
pear to have significantly impacted on their presence in 
these locations, which remains both significant in terms 
of the absolute number of locations in which they are to 
be found, and in terms of their apparent economic signif-
icance to these locations. Even if as a proportion of the 
total number of people employed within these firms, if 
treated as single entities, the numbers involved are rela-
tively small. Three obvious conclusions follow. 
First, it must be that these locations are of considerable 
significance to these firms or they would have, logically, 
abandoned their presence as attitudes towards them 
changed. Second, given the relatively small number of 
people employed in each such location it must be the 
case that the tax planning that exploits these locations 
is, very largely, undertaken ‘elsewhere’, as the literature 
on secrecy jurisdictions implies (Murphy 2009). The re-
lationship is, then, necessarily symbiotic. Although each 
of these firms wish to represent that they are networks 
of otherwise unrelated firms this does not appear to be 
the case: commonality of identity, codes of conduct and 
ethics, working practices and commercial practice noted 
during our research all suggests otherwise. In that case, 
and third, what we are witnessing, as evidenced by the 
changing way in which these firms suggest they supply 
their tax planning services, are organisations that devel-
op iteratively in response to political, social and econom-
ic pressure without, however, apparently changing either 
their course structure or purpose. This has been indicated 
by both the substantial continuity and similarity in the 
markets that they serve, which in turn suggest that they 
have developed a unique niche form of enterprise de-
signed to embrace both the onshore and offshore worlds 
in ways that their corporate structuring ensures is not 
readily apparent to those who make use of their services, 
or to regulators. 
Finally, we return to the classic question in organization 
studies and theories of institutional change with which 
we began: how to locate ‘isomorphism’ and when ‘decou-
pling’ will occur. Meyer and Rowan (1977: 360) suggest 
that isomorphism in an elaborated institutional environ-
ment will likely lead to three outcomes. The first is the 
“decoupling of structural subunits from each other and 
activity”, the second is “rituals of confidence and good 
faith”, and the third is “avoidance of inspection and ef-
fective evaluation”. 
Our investigation of the Big Four as GPSFs suggests that 
all three elements are present, and that through tracing 
the Big Four over time we have a robust case of isomor-
phism and its effects. Given the importance of GPSFs 
to contemporary capitalism, including both the public 
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and private sectors, developing investigative cases into 
how the Big Four operate is important for knowing what 
claims they make and can be made against them. Our 
mapping of their scale and activities, as well as their staff 
show an elaborate corporate structure that is indicative 
of decoupling. Our tracing of claims made on their cor-
porate web pages over time suggests that the Big Four do 
indeed engage in “rituals of confidence and good faith”. 
These rituals include providing information to clients 
about what tax services can be provided by their global 
network and, over time, to clients and regulators that 
they are treating governance pressures for greater trans-
parency with greater seriousness. The third element in 
avoiding inspection and evaluation comes from a com-
bination of corporate structure and professional prac-
tice. On the latter this emergences from the Big Four’s 
increasing immersion into advising on what regulators 
should want and oversee, primarily through its consul-
tancy operations (Boussard 2009; Sturdy et al. 2016; Hurl 
2018; Ylönen and Kuusela 2018). 
Investigating these three elements of isomorphism is a 
promising avenue for future research on GPSFs and the 
Big Four, in particular. Further work could look at how de-
coupling can empower managers in organizations to de-
fend themselves from external pressures (the literature 
here is extensive, see Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2009), 
with the Big Four providing excellent case material. The 
distance between forms of decoupling and legitimation 
rituals, such as proclamations of self-governance, could 
also be studied, especially since it is known that some 
other types of organizations engage decoupling to deal 
with legitimacy claims (Quirke 2013). A further vein of re-
search and conceptual development could focus on how 
avoidance of inspection and evaluation occurs in recur-
sive cycles linked to global norm-making on particular is-
sues (Halliday and Carruthers 2007). Existing research on 
how recursive cycles of engagement inform global norms 
focus on cases such as bankruptcy regimes, capital ac-
count governance, accountancy standards, and forestry, 
among others  (Halliday and Carruthers 2009; Kentike-
lenis and Seabrooke 2017; Botzem et al. 2017; Malets and 
Quack 2017). The relationship between such recursive 
cycles and isomorphic structures could be considered 
when it comes to how GPSFs behave in the international 
political economy. This may also include understanding 
the professional networks through settlements are made 
over how issues are diagnosed and treated (Seabrooke 
and Henriksen 2017). These future lines of research offer 
opportunities not only for empirical but also theoretical 
development.
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